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We reconsider the optimal taxation of income from labor and capital in the
stochastic growth model analyzed by Chari et al. (1994, 1995), but using a
linear-quadratic (LQ) approximation to derive a log-linear approximation to
the optimal policy rules. The example illustrates how inaccurate “naive” LQ
approximation — in which the quadratic objective is obtained from a simple
Taylor expansion of the utility function of the representative household — can
be, but also shows how a correct LQ approximation can be obtained, which will
provide a correct local approximation to the optimal policy rules in the case
of small enough shocks. We also consider the numerical accuracy of the LQ
approximation in the case of shocks of the size assumed in the calibration of
Chari et al. We find that the correct LQ approximation yields results that are
quite accurate, and similar in most respects to the results obtained by Chari
et al. using a more computationally intensive numerical method.
∗Presented by the second author as a Plenary Lecture at the 10th Annual Conference on Com-
puting in Economics and Finance, Amsterdam, Netherlands, July 8-10, 2004. We thank Vasco
Curdia and Mauro Roca for excellent research assistance, Ken Judd, Jinill Kim, Andy Levin and
Willi Semmler for helpful comments, and the National Science Foundation for research suppport.
Linear-quadratic (LQ) optimal-control problems have been the subject of an ex-
tensive literature.1 It is not clear, however, how likely it is that optimal policy
problems with explicit microfoundations — that is, policy problems in which both
the assumed objective of policy and the constraints on possible outcomes are derived
from an explicit account of the decision problems of private agents — should take
this form. Elsewhere (Benigno and Woodford, 2004b), we show that it is possible
in a broad class of models to derive an LQ problem that locally approximates an
exact policy problem, in the sense that the solution to the LQ problem represents a
local linear approximation to the solution to the exact problem, that will describe it
with arbitrary accuracy in the case of small enough random disturbances. It does not
generally suffice for this purpose to define an LQ problem in which the objective is
a local quadratic approximation to the exact objective and the constraints are local
linear approximations to the exact constraints.2 Nonetheless, we show that it is quite
generally possible to derive a correct LQ approximation, if sufficient care is taken in
the choice of the quadratic objective.
Here we illustrate both the potential problems with naive LQ approximation and
the application of our own method in the context of a well-known example, the
analysis of dynamic optimal taxation of income from labor and capital in an RBC
model, treated by Chari et al. (1994). The example is of interest not only because it
is a simple case in which naive LQ approximation would lead to extremely incorrect
conclusions, but also because the paper of Chari et al. is often cited as evidence
that log-linearization is dangerous in the context of optimal tax policy problems,
even if it can be used with fair accuracy in other contexts (such as the approximate
characterization of the aggregate fluctuations implied by an RBC model).
In fact, Chari et al. use a minimum-weighted-residual method that is computa-
tionally more difficult than ours to numerically characterize the optimal dynamics of
capital and labor taxes, and state that they do so because a log-linear approximation
was found to be quite inaccurate.3 We therefore consider the accuracy of the local
linear approximation provided by our LQ approach in the case of disturbances of
the amplitude assumed by Chari et al. in their numerical work. We do this both
1Important references include Bertsekas (1976), Chow (1975), Hansen and Sargent (2004), Kwak-
ernaak and Sivan (1972), and Sargent (1987).
2The problem with “naive” LQ approximation of this sort is discussed, for example, by Judd
(1996, sec. 4; 1999, pp. 505-508).
3They provide further details of the nature of the supposed inaccuracy of log-linearization in
Chari et al. (1995).
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by comparing our results with those obtained by Chari et al. using their preferred
method, and also by comparing them with those that would be obtained through
a second-order perturbation analysis of the exact conditions characterizing optimal
policy. We find that the second-order perturbation solution (a local approximation
that is accurate to second order in the amplitude of the disturbances, rather than only
to first order) differs only slightly from the linear approximation provided by our LQ
approach. Similarly, the numerical results of Chari et al. are much closer to those
implied by our log-linear approximation to optimal policy than their discussion of
the accuracy of log-linearization suggests. Hence we find that an LQ approximation,
when carried out correctly, gives a useful account of the way in which capital and
labor taxes should optimally be adjusted in response to real disturbances.
In section 1, we recapitulate the analysis of optimal tax policy in a real business
cycle model of Chari et al., in order to be clear about the policy problem that we
wish to approximate. In section 2, we first show how naive LQ approximation of
this problem would lead to incorrect conclusions, and then show how a correct LQ
approximation can instead be derived. In section 3, we calibrate the model in accor-
dance with the assumptions made in the analysis of Chari et al. (1994, 1995), and use
our LQ approach to compute some of the statistics regarding the optimal dynamics
of capital and labor taxes that they report; we then compare our results both with
theirs and with those obtained using a second-order perturbation technique. Section
4 concludes.
1 The Optimal Policy Problem
We begin by recalling the optimal policy problem analyzed by Chari et al. We
recall this, not only in order to be clear about the problem for which we seek to
derive an approximate solution, but also because our definition of the optimal policy
problem differs slightly from the presentation in the papers of Chari et al. Like
these authors, we are only interested in characterizing the stationary fluctuations in
the capital and labor tax rates that occur asymptotically under a Ramsey-optimal
policy. However, the stationary fluctuations that occur asymptotically under the
(unconstrained) Ramsey policy represent the solution to a constrained version of the
usual Ramsey problem (what we call optimal policy “from a timeless perspective”),




As in Chari et al. (1994), we extend a standard RBC model to include proportional
tax rates on labor and capital income, and the possibility for the government to issue
non-state-contingent real debt.4 There is a continuum of measure one of households
(here indexed by j) with identical time-separable preferences






with 0 < β < 1. The period utility function u is strictly increasing and concave
in consumption, c, and in the negative of hours worked, −h, and is continuously
differentiable and satisfies standard Inada conditions.
In addition to holding capital, households can also invest in a set of state-contingent
one-period real securities that span all of the states of nature that the households may
face in the next period. These securities are in zero net supply, except for the riskless
debt that is issued by the government. Each household is subject to a flow budget
constraint of the form
cjt + (k
j
t+1 − kjt ) + bjt ≤ ajt + (1− τ kt )(ρt − δ)kjt + (1− τht )wthjt , (1.2)
where kjt the stock of capital goods that it owns and rents to firms in period t, and
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 is the depreciation rate. In the budget constraint (1.2), bjt denotes the
household j’s value of the period-t portfolio of contingent securities which delivers a
state-contingent return at+1 at time t+1. The complete-markets assumption implies




4Chari et al. consider a more general framework, with a broader set of securities that may
be issued by the government. But they show that this does not increase the set of equilibrium
allocations that can be achieved through an appropriate policy, and that the presence of redundant
policy instruments simply results in indeterminacy of certain aspects of optimal policy. Here we
simplify the analysis, and obtain determinate results regarding the optimal state-contingent tax
rate on income from capital, by assuming only two dimensions along which policy can be varied
each period.
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which can be substituted into (1.2) to yield
cjt + (k
j
t+1 − kjt ) + Et[rt,t+1ajt+1] ≤ ajt + (1− τ kt )(ρt − δ)kjt + (1− τht )wthjt . (1.4)
Households can rent their capital goods to firms at an economy-wide rental rate,
given by ρt, and they work for an as well economy-wide wage rate given by wt. The
returns to these services are taxed at the rates τ kt and τ
h
t , respectively. Finally, the
household is subject to an appropriate set of borrowing limits.
The household’s optimization problem involves maximizing the utility function
(1.1) under the flow budget constraints (1.4) and the borrowing limits, given the
initial condition kt0 ≥ 0, subject to the additional constraints that cjt ≥ 0, hjt ≥
0, kjt+1 ≥ 0 for each t ≥ t0. The Inada conditions on the utility function ensure that
corner solutions can be ignored. Necessary and sufficient conditions for household
optimization are then:






















where rt is the risk-free one-period real rate defined by
1 + rt ≡ [Etrt,t+1]−1.





t) = βEt{uc(cjt+1, hjt+1)[(1− τ kt+1)(ρt+1 − δ) + 1]} (1.7)
for each date t.











= −(1− τht )wt (1.8)
for each date t.
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4. Finally, it is necessary that the household exhaust its intertemporal budget
constraint.
There is similarly a continuum of measure one of firms, which each produce a
homogeneous good using the same technology in competitive product and factor
markets. The good can be purchased by households, and used for both consumption
and investment (capital accumulation) purposes, and can also be consumed by the





f is a constant-returns-to-scale function and z is an exogenous labor-augmenting





t)− ρtkit − wthit. (1.9)











t) = wt (1.11)
at each time t. Given the symmetric structure of the model, it is clear that all
households make the same optimal choices at each date, and similarly for all firms;
we can thus omit the superscripts i and j in what follows.
It remains to describe the income and expenditure of the government. The gov-
ernment purchases goods and raises revenues through taxes on the services of capital
and labor. We assume that the government can borrow by issuing a one-period risk-




t−1(1 + rt−1)− st (1.12)
where bgt denotes the end-of-period liabilities of the government in units of these one-
period bonds, rt is the one-period real interest rate between periods t and t+ 1, and
st is the real primary government budget surplus. The latter quantity is defined by
st ≡ τ kt (ρt − δ)kt + τhtwtht − gt, (1.13)
where gt denotes government purchases of the good. Government purchases are
treated as an exogenously given stochastic process, rather than a policy decision
5
analyzed here. Rational-expectations equilibrium requires that the expected path of






T (ρT − δ)kT + τhTwThT − gT ] (1.14)
in each state of the world that may be realized at date t, where bst−1 ≡ bgt−1(1 + rt−1)
is the value owed by the government at the beginning of period t, i.e., the value at
maturity of the debt issued in period t − 1. (Because the debt is riskless, the value
of this variable is known at date t− 1.)
Finally, goods market equilibrium requires that
yt = f(kt, ztht) = ct + gt + kt+1 − (1− δ)kt. (1.15)
1.2 Optimal Policy
In a standard Ramsey policy problem,5 the government chooses state-contingent
paths for {τ kt , τht , bst , ct, ht, rt,t+1, kt+1, wt, ρt} for all periods t ≥ t0 that satisfy con-
ditions (1.5), (1.7), (1.8), (1.10), (1.11), (1.14), (1.15) at each time t, given initial
conditions bst0−1 and kt0 . We first write this problem in the more compact form pre-
sented by Chari et al., and then discuss the closely related problem that we actually
approximate.





βT−tuc(cT , hT )[f(kT , zThT )−(1−τ kT )(ρT−δ)kT−δkT−(1−τhT )wThT−gT ],
(1.16)
where we define
Vt ≡ bst−1uc(ct, ht), (1.17)
and make use of the relation
f(kt, ztht) = ρtkt + wtht.
5Note that this is not precisely the problem considered by Chari et al., for reasons discussed
below.
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We can furthermore substitute (1.8) into (1.16) for the labor tax rate, and similarly
use (1.7) to replace the expected future capital tax rate terms, yielding
Wt = b
s
t−1uc(ct, ht) + uc(ct, ht)kt[1 + (1− τ kt )(fk(kt, ztht)− δ)], (1.18)




βT−t[uc(cT , hT )cT + uh(cT , hT )hT ]. (1.19)
Thus the Ramsey policy problem can equivalently be stated as one of choosing state-
contingent paths of {τ kt , bst , ct, ht, kt+1} for each t ≥ t0 to maximize the utility (1.1),
subject to the constraints that (1.15), (1.18), (1.19) and
uc(ct, ht) = βEt{uc(ct+1, ht+1)[1 + (1− τ kt+1)(fk(kt+1, zt+1ht+1)− δ)]}, (1.20)
hold at each date t ≥ t0, given the initial conditions bst0−1 and kt0 .
In the case that there is no limit on the size of the taxes that may be levied ex
post on existing capital, this problem is equivalent to one of choosing the sequences
{ct, ht, kt+1}∞t=t0 to maximize (1.1) subject only to the constraint (1.15) for each t ≥ t0,
given the initial condition kt0 . For one can show that in the case of any sequences
{ct,ht, kt+1} satisfying (1.15) given the initial capital stock, and any initial public
debt bst0−1, it is possible to construct sequences {Wt, bst , τ kt } that satisfy the other
constraints as well. Note that (1.18) together with (1.20) implies that
uc(ct, ht)kt+1 = βEt[Wt+1 − bstuc(ct+1, ht+1)]. (1.21)
Then given sequences {ct, ht, kt+1} satisfying (1.15), one can solve (1.19) for the im-
plied sequence {Wt}∞t=t0 , then solve (1.21) for the implied sequence {bst}∞t=t0 , and finally
solve (1.18) for the implied sequence {τ kt }∞t=t0 . The constructed sequences necessarily
satisfy conditions (1.18), (1.19), and (1.21) each period in addition to (1.15), and as
a consequence they satisfy (1.20) each period as well.
It then follows that the Ramsey policy achieves the same (fully efficient) allocation
of resources, regardless of the size of the initial public debt bst0 ; an initial levy on the
pre-existing capital stock is simply used to raise whatever amount of government
revenue is needed in the initial period to make it possible to pay off this debt and
also finance all subsequent government purchases without any need for distorting
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taxes.6 The possibility of doing this, of course, depends in general on the possibility
of choosing a large value for τ kt0 , possibly one much larger than 1. This is not especially
realistic, and such an assumption makes the problem of optimal taxation too trivial.
Consequently, Chari et al., like many other authors, assume a limit on the degree
to which it is possible for the government to tax initially existing assets; specifically,
they assume that the initial tax rate on capital income (τ kt0) is given by a prior
commitment, though it may be freely chosen in all later periods.
We assume a constraint on initial policy in the same spirit, but specified slightly
differently, so as to make the policy problem recursive (unlike the precise problem
defined by Chari et al.); this has the technical advantage of making the optimal policy
consistent with a steady state, in the case of an appropriate initial capital stock and in
the absence of random disturbances, so that we can then approximate optimal policy
in the case of small enough disturbances using Taylor expansions of our objective
and constraints around this steady state.7 Specifically, we consider the problem of
choosing state-contingent paths of {τ kt , bst , ct, ht, kt+1} for each t ≥ t0 to maximize the
utility (1.1), subject to the constraints that (1.15), (1.18), (1.19) and (1.20) hold at
each date t ≥ t0, given the initial conditions bst0−1 and kt0 , and such that in addition
a constraint of the form
Wt0 = W¯t0 (1.22)
is satisfied, where Wt0 is defined by (1.19), and W¯t0 is a pre-existing state-contingent
commitment regarding the value (in marginal utility units) of the assets (debt and
capital) with which the representative household begins period t0. (The latter in-
terpretation of the commitment is seen from (1.18).) This commitment obviously
implies a limit on the extent to which tax revenues can be raised by taxing initially
existing capital, though there is no limit on the extent to which one may plan to tax
capital in later periods.
Following exactly the same argument as above, one can show that this con-
strained problem is equivalent to a simpler problem, namely, choosing sequences
{Wt, ct, ht, kt+1}∞t=t0 to maximize (1.1) subject only to the constraint that (1.15) hold
6In our version of the model, unanticipated ex post variation in the tax rate on capital would still
be used as a substitute for state-contingent public debt, in order to ensure intertemporal government
solvency in all states of the world.
7In Benigno and Woodford (2004b), we discuss recursive policy problems of this kind more
generally.
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for each t ≥ t0, given the initial condition kt0 , and to constraint (1.22), where Wt0 is
defined by (1.19). Once again, the optimal allocation (and the level of household util-
ity obtained) is independent of the initial condition bst0−1, as variations in the initial
level of public debt can still be completely offset by variations in the size of the levy
on initial capital, though the value of total initial household wealth (in marginal-
utility units) is constrained to equal W¯t0 . The value function for this problem can
therefore be written as J(kt0 , W¯t0 ; ξt0), where we use the notation ξt to refer to the
exogenous state of the world at date t (including all information available at t about
the probability of various exogenous disturbances at any later dates).8
This constrained policy problem is recursive, in the following sense. It can be
shown to be equivalent9 to solving a sequence of policy problems, at each date t ≥
t0, where the policy problem at date t is to choose values (ct, ht, kt+1), and state-
contingent commitments W¯t+1 for each possible state of the world in the following
period, so as to maximize
u(ct, ht) + βEtJ(kt+1, W¯t+1; ξt+1),
subject to the constraints (1.15) and
W¯t = uc(ct, ht)ct + uh(ct, ht)ht + βEtW¯t+1, (1.23)
given the values for kt and W¯t determined in the previous period. Here J(k, W¯ ; ξ)
is the value function for the problem defined in the previous paragraph; it can be
shown that the value of the single-period decision problem just defined is also given
by J(kt, W¯t; ξt). Given the state-contingent paths {Wt, ct, ht, kt+1} that solve this
problem, the associated paths for the public debt and tax rates are given by (1.8),
(1.18), (1.21), and the initial condition bst0−1.
As noted above, Chari et al. assume a somewhat different constraint on policy
in period t0. However, one can show that the policy problem that they define is
equivalent to a two-stage problem, in which values (ct0 , ht0 , kt0+1) and state-contingent
commitments W¯t0+1 are chosen in the first stage, subject to the initial constraint
specified by Chari et al. (rather than a constraint on the value of Wt0), and policy
8This corresponds simply to the vector of exogenous disturbances at date t if each disturbance
is Markovian, as in the quantitative example treated below.
9The proof follows the same lines as the proof of Proposition 2 in Benigno and Woodford (2004a),
and is omitted here.
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from date t0 + 1 onward is chosen to solve the kind of constrained problem defined
here, given the commitments W¯t0+1 chosen in the first stage.
10 Hence if the optimal
dynamics of tax rates and other endogenous variables eventually exhibit stationary
fluctuations (as they find to be the case), these stationary fluctuations correspond to
the equilibrium dynamics under a constrained problem of the kind that we propose,
for a suitable choice of the initial commitment W¯t0 . It follows that we can characterize
the asymptotic dynamics of tax rates in the model of Chari et al. (which is the main
goal of their paper) by characterizing the solution to the constrained policy problem
defined here.
An advantage of our reformulation of the optimal policy problem is that the
problem that we define — unlike the one that they consider — has as its solution a
steady state (or more precisely, a balanced growth path, with constant tax rates) in
the case that there are no random fluctuations in either technology or government
purchases, if the initial capital stock kt0 happens to be consistent with the steady
state associated with the initial commitment W¯t0 . There is furthermore asymptotic
convergence to a steady state of this kind under the constrained optimal policy in
the case of other (sufficiently nearby) initial conditions. Hence we can characterize
the stationary asymptotic fluctuations in tax rates under optimal policy, in the case
of small enough shocks, through a local characterization of optimal policy near such
a steady state.
Because of this property of optimal dynamics subject to the constraint (1.22), we
need not introduce any additional constraints on the admissible range of variation
in tax rates (say, an upper bound of 100 percent taxation of income from capital).
Assuming initial conditions consistent with a steady state in which such a bound does
not bind, the bound will also never bind at any date in the event of small enough
shocks, and so we need not consider it at all. If, instead, we were to impose such
a bound as an alternative to constraint (1.22) (and the bound were tight enough to
preclude the first-best allocation, but loose enough to not bind in the event of zero
taxation of capital income), optimal policy would not correspond to a steady state
10The proof follows the same lines as the proof of Proposition 1 in Benigno and Woodford (2004a),
and is omitted here. Chari et al. (1994, p. 625) note that under their formulation of the Ramsey
policy problem, the optimal allocation is described by a set of time-invariant allocation rules that
apply in each period t ≥ t0 + 1, though not in the initial period. Our reformulation of the policy
problem makes it clear that the optimal choices (ct, ht, kt+1) will be time-invariant functions of the
state variables (kt, ξt).
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even in the case of a fully deterministic environment (as the upper bound on the
capital tax rate would be initially binding, but never again binding after some finite
date), so that the kind of local approximation used below would not be valid even in
the case of arbitrarily small shocks and suitably chosen initial conditions.
We now turn to the characterization of optimal steady states for the policy prob-
lem just defined.
1.3 Balanced Growth and Detrending
Again following Chari et al., we assume that the exogenous disturbances zt and gt
each fluctuate around a deterministic trend that grows as ρt, for some ρ ≥ 1. We
assume that preferences are consistent with a balanced growth path; specifically, we





where 0 < γ < 1, ϕ < 1, 6= 0, or (corresponding to the case ϕ = 0)
u(c, h) = (1− γ) log c+ γ log(1− h). (1.25)
We also assume a production function of the parametric form
f(k, zh) = kα(zh)1−α
for some 0 < α < 1.
We then define detrended versions of the model variables
c˜t ≡ ct
ρt
, y˜t ≡ yt
ρt










while ht is already a stationary variable without detrending. Given this transfor-
mation, it can be shown that the optimal policy problem has the same formulation
as presented above except for a redefinition of the discount factor β, which must be
replaced by
β˜ = βρϕ(1−γ),
and a similar redefinition of the depreciation rate δ, which is replaced by
δ˜ ≡ 1− (1− δ)ρ−1.
11
Moreover the production function must be redefined as
y˜t = f˜(k˜, z˜h) ≡ ρ−αk˜α(z˜h)1−α. (1.26)
In what follows, we drop the tildes (so that “ct” actually refers to c˜t, and so on),
but all variables without a tilde should be interpreted as having been appropriately
detrended. We preserve the notation β˜ and δ˜ for the alternative numerical coefficients
that occur in various equations, as this will be important in calibrating the numerical
values of these coefficients.
After this rescaling of variables, (1.18) implies
Wt ≡ bst−1uc(ct, ht) + uc(ct, ht)kt[(1− δ˜) + (1− τ kt )fk(ztht, kt) + δρ−1τ kt ], (1.27)
where we note that
δρ−1 = ρ−1 − (1− δ˜),
while (1.20) becomes
uc(ct, ht) = β˜Et{uc(ct+1, ht+1)[(1− δ˜) + (1− τ kt+1)fk(kt+1, zt+1ht+1) + δρ−1τ kt+1]}.
(1.28)
1.4 Optimal Steady States
Here we show the existence of a steady state, i.e., of an optimal policy (under
appropriate initial conditions) of the above policy problem that involves constant
values of all stationary variables. We now consider a deterministic problem in which
the detrended exogenous disturbances zt, gt, each take constant values z¯ > 0 and
g¯ ≥ 0 for all t ≥ t0, and we start from initial conditions bst0−1 = b¯ > 0 and kt0 = k¯ > 0.
Given any initial detrended debt b¯, we wish to find initial commitments W¯t0 = W¯
and an initial detrended capital stock k¯ > 0 such that the optimal plan involves a
constant policy τ¯h,τ¯ k, c¯, h¯, k¯, b¯ and Wt = W¯ , each period, where b¯, k¯ and W¯ coincide
with the initial conditions.
The optimization problem can be equivalently written as choosing the sequences






u(cT , hT ) (1.29)
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subject to the sequence of constraints
f(kt, ztht) = ct + gt + kt+1 − (1− δ˜)kt (1.30)
for each t ≥ t0, given the initial condition kt0 > 0, and the additional constraint






[uc(cT , hT )cT + uh(cT , hT )hT ]. (1.31)
The first-order conditions with respect to ct take the form
uc(ct, ht)− [uc(ct, ht) + ucc(ct, ht)ct + uhc(ct, ht)ht]λ0 − λ1,t = 0 (1.32)
for each t ≥ t0, where λ0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint
on Wt0 and {λ1,t} is the sequence of multipliers associated with the sequence of
constraints (1.30). The first-order condition with respect to ht can similarly be written
0 = uh(ct, ht)− [uch(ct, ht)ct + uhh(ct, ht)ht + uh(ct, ht)]λ0 +
+z¯fh(kt, z¯ht)λ1,t (1.33)
for each t ≥ t0. Finally, the first-order condition with respect to kt+1 is given by
λ1,t − β˜[fk(kt+1, z¯ht+1) + (1− δ˜)]λ1,t+1 = 0 (1.34)
for each t ≥ t0.
In a steady-state solution, these conditions respectively reduce to
u¯c(c¯, h¯)− [u¯c(c¯, h¯) + u¯cc(c¯, h¯)c¯+ u¯hc(c¯, h¯)h¯]λ¯0 − λ¯1 = 0, (1.35)
u¯h(c¯, h¯)− [u¯ch(c¯, h¯)c¯+ u¯hh(c¯, h¯)h¯+ u¯h(c¯, h¯)]λ¯0 + z¯fh(k¯, z¯h¯)λ¯1 = 0, (1.36)
and
1 = β˜[fk(k¯, z¯h¯) + (1− δ˜)]. (1.37)
A first implication of equations (1.37) and (1.7) is that the optimal steady-state tax
on capital is zero, as found by Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986).
Equations (1.35), (1.36), (1.37) together with
c¯+ g¯ + δ˜k¯ = f(k¯, z¯h¯) (1.38)
13
(1− β˜)W¯ = u¯c(c¯, h¯)c¯+ u¯h(c¯, h¯)h¯ (1.39)




can be solved, given b¯, to obtain the steady-state values for h¯, c¯, k¯, λ¯0, λ¯1, W¯ . The
initial level of debt b¯ can be freely chosen, within certain bounds that ensure that the
problem has a solution. Finally, the steady-state tax rate on labor is determined by
u¯h(c¯, h¯)
u¯c(c¯, h¯)
= −(1− τ¯h)z¯fh(k¯, z¯h¯), (1.41)
where if τ¯h is restricted to lie within the range 0 ≤ τ¯h ≤ 1, tighter restrictions on the
feasible initial level of debt must be imposed.
2 Linear-Quadratic Approximations, Correct and
Incorrect
We now consider an approximate characterization of the optimal dynamics of capital
and labor income tax rates in the case of small enough shocks, and initial conditions
close enough to consistency with an optimal steady state. We first show that a naive
approach to LQ approximation would not yield correct results, and then show how a
correct LQ approximate problem can be derived.
2.1 Naive LQ Approximation
By “naive” LQ approximation we mean an approach that would simply compute a
second-order Taylor series expansion of the utility function around the steady-state
allocation, and maximize this quadratic objective (or minimize the corresponding
quadratic loss function) subject to the linear constraints obtained by log-linearizing
the requirements for a rational-expectations equilibrium around that same steady-
state allocation. In general, the solution to the LQ problem defined in this way will
not be a correct linear approximation to optimal policy, even in the case of small
enough shocks and initial conditions close enough to consistency with the steady
state around which the Taylor series expansions are computed, for reasons discussed
in Judd (1995, 1999), Kim and Henderson (2004, appendix), Kim and Kim (2003),
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Kim et al. (2003), Woodford (2002; 2003, chap. 6), and Benigno and Woodford
(2004b).
Suppose that we compute a second-order Taylor series expansion to the utility
function (1.1), expanding in powers of log deviations of consumption and hours11
from the steady-state levels of these variables, in an optimal steady state of the kind
characterized in the previous section. The choice of the particular steady state around
which we compute our expansions is arbitrary; the local approximation to optimal
policy (if valid at all) will apply to initial conditions close enough to consistency with
that particular steady state. In our numerical work, we calibrate the steady state to
involve a tax rate on labor income that coincides with the long-run average value in
the simulations of Chari et al. (1994).
















where cˆt ≡ log(ct/c¯),12 hˆt ≡ log(ht/h¯); the expression “t.i.p.” indicates terms that
are independent of policy (because they depend only on the exogenous state of the
world), and so irrelevant for welfare comparison of alternative policies; and the resid-
ual is of third or higher order in the bound ||ξ|| on the amplitude of the exogenous
disturbances, on the assumption that the log deviations cˆt and hˆt are at most of
order O(||ξ||), as will be true under optimal policy in the case of initial conditions
consistent with the steady state, or deviating from it by an amount that is only
of order O(||ξ||).13 In writing the coefficients of this expansion, we have defined
φ ≡ −u¯hh¯/u¯cc¯, σ−1 ≡ −u¯ccc¯/u¯c, ν ≡ u¯hhh¯/u¯h, and ψ ≡ u¯chh¯/u¯c.14 Thus expected
utility Ut0 varies inversely, in the case of small enough disturbances, with a quadratic
11Our Taylor series expansion is in terms of the logs of consumption and hours, rather than
consumption and hours themselves, because we intend to log-linearize constraints.
12It should be recalled that here and below ct actually refers to the detrended level of consumption
c˜t, kt refers to the detrended capital stock k˜t, and so on.
13It is important for this last conclusion to be correct that we have chosen an optimal steady state
around which to compute our Taylor series expansion.
14In the case of the form of preferences (1.24), these coefficients correspond to φ = (γ/1−γ)(h¯/1−
h¯), σ−1 = −[(1− γ)ϕ− 1], ν = (1− γϕ)(h¯/1− h¯), and ψ = −γϕ(h¯/1− h¯).
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[(σ−1 − 1)cˆ2t − 2ψcˆthˆt + φ(1 + ν)hˆ2t ] + φhˆt − cˆt. (2.3)
We can log-linearize the constraint (1.30) around the same steady state, obtaining
kˆt+1 = β˜
−1
kˆt − s−1k [sccˆt − (1− α)(zˆt + hˆt) + sggˆt], (2.4)
where kˆt ≡ log(kt/k¯), zˆt ≡ log zt, and gˆt ≡ log(gt/g¯), and in writing the coefficients






T−t0{dccˆT + dhhˆT}, (2.5)
where W˜t0 ≡ (W¯t0 − W¯ )/u¯cc¯ is given as an initial condition, and we define the
coefficients dc ≡ 1 − σ−1 + ψ, dh ≡ ψ − φ(1 + ν). The naive LQ approximate
problem would then be to choose sequences {cˆt, hˆt, kˆt+1}∞t=t0 to minimize the loss
function defined by (2.2) – (2.3) subject to constraints (2.4) and (2.5), given the
initial conditions kˆt0 and W˜t0 .
The solution to this LQ problem is not generally a correct linear approximation
to the optimal policy defined in the previous section. It is especially easy to see
this in the case of preferences of the form (1.25), which corresponds to the baseline
calibration in Chari et al. (1994). In this case σ = 1, ψ = 0, and the naive loss




φ(1 + ν)hˆ2t + φhˆt − cˆt. (2.6)
This loss function would not penalize fluctuations in any endogenous variables other
than hours worked.
One can easily show that this LQ problem has a solution in which neither random
fluctuations in technology nor in government purchases should be allowed to have
any effect on equilibrium hours worked. (If we assume that W¯t0 = W¯ and that
there are no deviations of either gt or zt from their trend values that are forecastable
as of date t0, then the solution involves hˆt = 0 for all dates t ≥ t0.) This is clearly
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possible to achieve through a suitable tax policy, since absolutely any linear responses
of the endogenous variables {cˆt, hˆt} to unexpected shocks at dates after t0 will be
consistent with (2.5), and there will exist paths for {cˆt, kˆt+1} consistent with (2.4)
under the assumption that hˆt = 0 at all dates. Indeed, there will exist an infinity
of bounded processes of this kind, for any bounded fluctuations in the disturbances
{zˆt, gˆt}, including ones in which consumption and capital accumulation respond to
arbitrary random events (“sunspots”); and according to the objective defined by (2.2)
and (2.6), these processes are all equally optimal.
But it is not hard to show that these are not correct conclusions about the solution
to the optimization problem stated in the previous section. For example, consider
allocations in which ht = h¯ at all dates, and ask whether it is really true that the
introduction of random variations in the paths of capital and consumption, of a kind
consistent with the feasibility constraint (1.30), in response to sunspot events not
forecastable at date t0, will have no effect on expected utility, considering only effects
of second order in the amplitude of the disturbances. The conclusion is obviously
wrong: any such response to sunspot events (even if both the capital stock and
consumption remain within intervals of a width that is O(||ξ||)) will lower expected
utility, and by an amount that is of second order, owing both to the concavity of
utility in consumption and to the concavity of the production function in capital. One
can similarly show, by substituting a constant number of hours into the first-order
conditions for Ramsey policy presented in section 1.4 above, that these conditions
cannot be jointly satisfied by any policy that keeps hours constant; and furthermore
one or more equations must have a discrepancy that is of order O(||ξ||), so that this
is not even a correct first-order approximation to the optimal labor allocation.
The problem with the naive LQ analysis is that while (2.1) does give a correct
approximation to expected utility, that is accurate to second order if all terms are
evaluated under a candidate policy in a way that is accurate to second order, a solution
for the paths {cˆt, hˆt} under a given policy that is accurate only to first order will not
suffice to allow a sufficiently accurate evaluation of the linear terms in (2.1). And
while the log-linearized constraint (2.4) correctly indicates to first order the available
tradeoffs between fluctuations in consumption, hours, and capital, it omits second-
order terms. For example, in the case that {kt+1} varies in response to unforecastable
sunspot events while ht remains constant, as in the thought experiment of the previous
paragraph, the path {cˆt} implied by (2.4) omits negative second-order effects on the
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expected level of log consumption that occur as a result of the concavity of both utility
(i.e., of the log function) and of the production function. But these omitted second-
order effects may affect expected utility as much as do the included Et0hˆ
2
t terms, even
if the amplitude of the fluctuations is made arbitrarily small. Thus the LQ analysis
gives an incorrect welfare ranking of alternative possible patterns of response of the
endogenous variables to random disturbances, even when the disturbances are small.
2.2 An Alternative Quadratic Objective
One way of correcting the problem just illustrated would be to approximate the con-
straints to an accuracy that is at least second order in the amplitude of departures
from the steady-state allocation. This can be done, for example, using a higher-order
Taylor series expansion of the exact conditions; but this would mean abandoning the
convenience of an LQ framework for the approximate policy problem. Alternatively,
we can replace the quadratic objective derived in the previous section by an alter-
native function, that also approximates expected utility to second order,15 and that
involves no linear terms of the kind present in (2.1). It is then possible to evaluate
the quadratic objective to second order using only a characterization of equilibrium
fluctuations that is accurate to first order. In Benigno and Woodford (2004b), we
show that it is quite generally possible to derive a quadratic approximation to utility
with this property, as long as the steady state around which one expands is itself
optimal — i.e., it represents optimal policy in the case that there are no random
disturbances, as is the case in our example. Here we illustrate how this is possible in
the present problem.
We begin with the second-order Taylor series expansion for utility (2.1), which













15Of course, since the functions are different, they are not equal to second order in the case of all
possible paths for the endogenous variables. However, they may be equal in the case of all paths
that represent possible equilibria. The representation (2.1) is the unique approximation that would
be accurate to second order in the case of arbitrary small departures from the steady state, even
those that are not possible under any tax policy — but that property is stronger than is necessary
for our purposes.
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where the vector xt is defined as x
′










−ψ φ(1 + ν)
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(1− α)(hˆ2t + 2zˆthˆt)}+ t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3), (2.8)





































where we have used the definition ξ′t = [zˆt gˆt ].
The final expression that we need to approximate is (1.31). As it is shown in the













(1− σ−1 + ψ − σ−1σ−11 − σ−1ψ2 − 2σ−1)cˆ2t +
+(ψψ1 − σ−1ψ2 + 2ψ)cˆthˆt}
+t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3). (2.10)
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where we have defined σ−11 ≡ u¯cccc¯/u¯cc, ψ1 ≡ u¯chhh¯/u¯ch, ψ2 ≡ u¯cchh¯/u¯cc, ν1 ≡


















(1− σ−1 + ψ)





(1− σ−1 + ψ − σ−1σ−11 − σ−1ψ2 − 2σ−1) (ψψ1 − σ−1ψ2 + 2ψ)









We can now use an appropriate linear combination of (2.9) and (2.11) to obtain an
expression with linear terms that exactly cancel those in (2.7). Using this expression

















+ u¯cc¯ϑ2W˜t0 + t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3)
where
Qx ≡ Ax + ϑ1Bx + ϑ2Cx
Qξ ≡ ϑ1Bξ + ϑ2Cξ
qk ≡ α(1− α)ϑ1
and
ϑ1 =
−φ(σ−1 + ν) + ψ(φ+ 1)
ψ[(1− α) + sc] + τ¯h(1− α)(1 + ν)− (1− α)(σ−1 + ν) ,
ϑ2 =
τ¯h(1− α)
ψ[(1− α) + sc] + τ¯h(1− α)(1 + ν)− (1− α)(σ−1 + ν) .
We note that for low values of ψ and τ¯h, it is likely that ϑ1 > 0 and ϑ2 < 0. We also
note that the term ϑ2W˜t0 is independent of policy, because of the initial commitment
regarding the value of W˜t0 .
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It then follows that maximization of expected utility is equivalent, to second order,
to the minimization of an objective of the form (2.2), where the period loss function












ˆ˜kt = kˆt − (zˆt + hˆt), (2.12)























qc(cˆt − θhˆt)2 + qh(hˆt − h∗t )2 + qk ˆ˜k2t
}
, (2.13)
where we have defined qc ≡ qx,11, θ ≡ −qx,12/qx,11, qh ≡ qx,22 − q2x,12/qx,11, and
h∗t ≡ θz zˆt, in which expression θz ≡ −q−1h qξ,21.
Expression (2.13) is now a quadratic loss function with no linear terms, as de-
sired. In the appendix, we present the general conditions under which this function
is convex, at least on the linear subspace of sequences consistent with our log-linear
constraints. (Convexity in this sense ensures that the first-order conditions for the
LQ problem defined in the next section characterize a loss minimum, and hence a
welfare maximum.) Here it suffices to note that sufficient conditions for convexity are
that the coefficients qc, qh, qk all be positive; in the numerical examples considered in
the next section, this is always the case.
It follows that the objective of policy can be understood as a combination of
three distinct stabilization goals. The first is stabilization of a linear combination
of consumption and hours; the second is stabilization of hours around a level that
depends on the current state of productivity; and the third is stabilization of the
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capital stock per unit of effective labor supply (i.e., labor supply in efficiency units).
Optimal policy will generally involve some tradeoff among these three goals. Note that
the quadratic loss function obtained in this way is quite different from the function
(2.3) obtained from a simple Taylor series expansion of the utility function.
2.3 A Correct LQ Approximation
Because (2.13) contains no linear terms, this loss function can be evaluated to sec-
ond order using only a log-linear approximation to the equilibrium evolution of the
endogenous variables under a given policy. It follows that we may represent the
constraints upon the outcomes achievable under alternative policies, to a sufficient
degree of accuracy, using only log-linear approximations to the structural equations
that must be satisfied in a rational-expectations equilibrium.
Our approximate LQ problem is then to choose sequences {cˆt, hˆt, kˆt+1}∞t=t0 to min-
imize the loss function defined by (2.2) and (2.13) subject to the constraints (2.4)
and (2.5), given the initial conditions kˆt0 and W˜t0 . The solution to this problem will
be given by a set of time-invariant policy rules if W˜t0 is chosen in a suitable way as
a function of the values of kˆt0 , zˆt0 , and gˆt0 — specifically, if the initial commitment
is the same function of the initial state as the corresponding commitments made at
later dates will be of the economy’s state at those later dates. One simple way to
ensure this is to specify W˜t0 to take the value such that the constraint (2.5) does
not bind — i.e., such that the solution processes {cˆt, hˆt, kˆt+1} are the same as if this
constraint were omitted. This is the specification of W˜t0 that we shall choose. The
approximate LQ problem can then be stated more simply as the choice of sequences
{cˆt, hˆt, kˆt+1}∞t=t0 to minimize the loss function defined by (2.2) and (2.13) subject to
the constraint (2.4), given the initial condition kˆt0 .
Once we have solved for the optimal allocation {cˆt, hˆt, kˆt+1}, the implied path for





T−t0{dccˆT + dhhˆT}, (2.14)
which represents a log-linear approximation to (1.19). (The coefficients are the same
as in (2.5), which is a special case of this equation.) The implied value of the public
debt bˆst ≡ log(bst/b¯) each period can then be obtained by solving
β˜
−1
sk[kˆt+1+Et(−σ−1cˆt+1+ψhˆt+1)] = scEtW˜t+1−sb[bˆst+Et(−σ−1cˆt+1+ψhˆt+1)], (2.15)
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which represents a log-linear approximation to (1.21), where sb ≡ b¯/y¯. The implied
capital income tax rate τˆ kt ≡ − log(1−τ kt ) each period is similarly obtained by solving
scW˜t = sbbˆ
s
t−1 − bccˆt + bhhˆt + bkkˆt + s−1c α(1− α)zˆt − bττ kt , (2.16)




−1, bh ≡ sbψ+β˜−1skψ+α(1−α), bk ≡ β˜−1sk−α(1−α), and bτ ≡ sk(β˜−1−ρ−1).
Finally, we can obtain the optimal path of the tax on labor income by using a
log-linear approximation of (1.8) in which (1.11) is used to substitute for wt. This
yields
τˆht = zˆt + α
ˆ˜kt − (σ−1 − φ−1ψ)cˆt − (ν − ψ)hˆt. (2.17)
In this way, we obtain log-linear equations for the optimal responses of both tax rates
to exogenous disturbances.
3 Optimal Policy: Numerical Results
We now illustrate the results that we obtain from a numerical application of the above
method, when the model is parameterized as in Chari et al. (1994). Comparing our
results to those that they obtain using an alternative numerical method will provide
one way of judging the numerical accuracy of the LQ approximation.
3.1 Parameter Values
Following Chari et al. (1994), we assign the parameters α, β˜, γ, δ˜, ρ, and g¯ the values
listed in Table 1.16 Chari et al. consider the effects of alternative values for the
preference parameter ϕ (their ψ); like them, we give primary emphasis to the two
cases ϕ = 0 (the “baseline” case) and ϕ = −8 (the “high risk-aversion” case). As
shown in the second panel of Table 1, we obtain different steady-state values for a
number of variables in the two cases.
16The exact values used for α , δ˜ and g¯ are actually longer decimals, supplied by Larry Christiano,
but rounded to three digits in the table. The same is true of the values given below for σg and σz.
The value here used for g¯ assumes a supply of hours (to be used either for work or leisure) that
is normalized to equal 1, and a steady-state value for the detrended productivity factor z¯ that is
normalized to equal 1.
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We have shown above that an optimal steady state necessarily involves τ¯ k = 0;
however, given the model parameters, there is a continuum of steady states with
different steady-state tax rates on labor income, corresponding to different choices
for the value of initial private wealth W¯t0 (and correspondingly different steady-state
levels of public debt). We specify W¯ in the case of each choice of the preference
parameter ϕ so that the resulting optimal steady state corresponds to the steady state
around which the dynamics fluctuate asymptotically in the “baseline” and “high risk-
aversion” simulations of Chari et al. (1994) respectively.17 In our calculations, we
do this by specifying the steady-state labor tax rate τ¯h to equal the long-run average
labor tax rate reported by Chari et al. (1994, Table 2) for those two simulations, and
then inferring the steady-state values k¯, y¯, W¯ , b¯s, and so on implied by these choices.
The steady-state values of several variables that are important for the derivation of
our LQ approximate policy problem are shown in the second panel of Table 2, in the
two columns corresponding to the two alternative specifications of ϕ and τ¯h.
These values are obtained as follows. The steady-state relations (1.37) and (1.38)
imply respectively that the shares sc, sg, sk must satisfy the two relations
(1− δ˜) + αs−1k = β˜
−1
, (3.1)
sc + sg + δ˜sk = 1. (3.2)
Steady-state relation (1.41) implies that
φ = (1− τ¯h)(1− α)s−1c , (3.3)





1− h¯ . (3.4)






17Because Chari et al. do not impose an initial constraint of a kind that makes their optimal policy
problem recursive, and do not start from initial conditions consistent with the long-run steady state,
their simulations eventually fluctuate around a steady state with a level of public debt different from
the level that they assume as an initial condition, and the extent to which this is true depends on
the preference parameter ϕ. Because we wish to characterize the asymptotic fluctuations and to
compare our results to those that they report, we assume a different steady-state public debt in the
two cases.
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using the normalization z¯ = 1. Combining equations (3.2) – (3.5), we can solve for














Given the calibrated parameter values from the first panel of Table 1, (3.1) allows
us to determine the implied value for sk. This value, together with the assumed value
of τ¯h (which varies for the two cases considered in the second panel of the table),
allows us to solve for steady-state output y¯, and hence for sg. We can then solve
(3.2) for the implied value of sc, (3.3) for the implied value of φ, and then (3.4) for
the implied value of h¯. Once we have determined the steady-state values of these
variables, we can similarly solve for the implied values of variables such as W¯ and b¯s,
though these do not matter for the calculations reported below.
We specify each of the two exogenous disturbance processes x = zˆ, gˆ as a station-
ary AR(1) process
xt = ρxxt−1 + ²
x
t , (3.7)
where 0 ≤ ρx < 1 and {²xt } is an i.i.d. random variable with bounded support; the
two innovation processes are furthermore assumed to be independent of one another.
Like Chari et al. (1994, 1995), we parameterize the disturbance processes so as to
match both the standard deviation σx and the coefficient of autocorrelation ρx of the
empirical measures of these disturbances discussed in Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1992); the values of these moments that we match are given in the third panel of
Table 1. Unlike Chari et al., we do not use a numerical method that requires us to
discretize our disturbance processes (they assume two-state Markov chains for each
disturbance), and so we adopt a convenient AR(1) specification.18 To be specific, in
our numerical simulations we assume that ²xt takes each period either the value +δx
or the value −δx, with equal probability, where δx ≡ ((1− ρ2x)σ2x)1/2.
18This has no consequences at all for the computation of first and second moments implied by our
LQ approximation, or alternatively by log-linearization of the conditions that characterize Ramsey
policy. The exact law of motion of the disturbances may affect our second-order perturbation
calculations, but we find in any event that the second-order corrections are small. The assumed
disturbance processes (3.7) allow our model to fall within the class of models treated by Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe (2004a), so that we can employ their computer code to compute the second-order
approximate solution discussed below.
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It might appear from the above that our method cannot be applied without first
performing the calculations undertaken by Chari et al., which are used as the source
of the steady-state values for τ¯h. But we choose this parameter in this way because we
wish to examine the extent to which our method results in a similar characterization of
the optimal stationary (asymptotic) fluctuations in tax rates as does theirs, in the case
that the initial commitment in our policy problem is defined so as to imply the same
long-run steady state (in the absence of shocks) as in the policy problem that they
consider. (This last qualification is necessary because the present model — unlike the
one considered in Benigno and Woodford, 2004a, for example — allows a continuum
of optimal steady states, to different ones of which the optimal dynamics converge in
the case of different initial conditions.) If we were simply interested in characterizing
optimal tax policy for an economy such as the U.S., starting from historically given
initial conditions, this way of determining τ¯h would not be necessary. We could, for
example, assign W¯ the value that would correspond to the value that private wealth
would be expected to have if current U.S. policy were to continue, and determine the
optimal steady state consistent with this. This would correspond to somewhat higher
values for τ¯h than those reported in Table 1 and used in the calculations below.
3.2 Optimal Fluctuations in Tax Rates
The parameter values reported in Table 1 allow us to compute both the coefficients of
the quadratic loss function (2.13) and the coefficients of the log-linearized constraints.
The coefficients of the loss function for each of the two cases considered in the middle
panel of Table 1 are given in Table 2. We note that in each case, qc, qh, qk > 0, so
that the loss function is obviously convex and the second-order conditions for loss
minimization are satisfied.
It is then straightforward to characterize the optimal linear decision rules for this
problem (though we omit the algebra here). We obtain a linear equation of the form
kˆt+1 = Γkvt, where vt is the state vector [kˆt zˆt gˆt]
′. This equation together with the
specification (3.7) for the disturbance processes then completely defines the law of
motion of the state vector {vt}.We also obtain linear equations cˆt = Γcvt, hˆt = Γhvt for
the rest of the optimal resource allocation, so that the dynamics of consumption and
hours are also completely described. Substitution of these solutions into equations
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τ (0)vt + Γ
k
τ (1)vt−1 (3.8)
for the optimal dynamics of the tax rates.
From the log-linear dynamics implied by these equations, we can compute the
implied first and second moments of the tax-rate processes reported by Chari et al.
(1994, Table 2), which we present in Table 3. As in the table of Chari et al., the
columns of our table refer to five separate cases. The first column is the baseline
case, in which ϕ = 0 and the two disturbance processes are parameterized in the
way described in Table 1. The second column is the high risk-aversion case, in which
instead ϕ = −8. In the third column, we again assume ϕ = 0, but now that there
are no variations in government purchases (i.e., we set σg = 0); in the fourth column,
assumptions are again as in the baseline case, except that there are no variations in
the rate of technical progress (i.e., we set σz = 0). Finally, in the fifth column, ϕ = 0,
and both kinds of random disturbances exist, but we assume that neither disturbance
is serially correlated (i.e., we assume the values given in Table 1 for σz and σg, but
we set ρz = ρg = 0).
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Like Chari et al., we report statistics regarding the optimal fluctuations in the
labor income tax rate τht , the ex post capital income rate τ
k
t , and an “ex ante tax





Et[uc(ct+1, ht+1)(fk(kt+1, zt+1ht+1)− δρ−1)] . (3.9)
The means and standard deviations of all tax rates are reported in percentage points
(i.e., we actually report 100E(τht ), etc.). Given the linearity of the policy rules that
solve the LQ problem, we are able to obtain analytical results for these moments
as functions of model parameters (including the parameters of the disturbance pro-
cesses), rather than computing sample statistics from a stochastic simulation, as in
Chari et al.
19In simulations 3 through 5, we choose the same value for τ¯h as in the baseline case, though the
average labor tax rates reported by Chari et al. in these cases are slightly different (see Table 4
below). Because the long-run steady state should have been the same in these cases as in the first
column, in the absence of disturbances, we have computed our local expansions around the same
steady state in these cases.
20This definition follows Chari et al. (1994, p. 627). In our expression of the formula here, ct
refers to the detrended consumption level c˜t, and so on.
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Most of our statistics are quite similar to those reported by Chari et al. (1994),
which we reproduce in Table 4.21 The most visible difference is in the average level
of the tax rate on capital income; while our method and theirs give quite similar
results regarding the mean “ex ante tax rate” defined in (3.9), the ex post tax rate
varies so much that even modest non-linearities in its response to shocks do have a
non-negligible effect on the mean ex post rate.22 Our conclusions about the degree
of optimal variation in capital and labor income tax rates, and the degree to which
they should co-vary with each of the disturbances are essentially the same as those
obtained by Chari et al., and so we do not discuss them further.
We note, however, that there are a number of advantages of our approach to
calculations of this kind. One is that our LQ formulation makes it easy to check
the second-order conditions for optimality of the policy that satisfies our first-order
conditions; this is not addressed by Chari et al., who simply compute an approximate
solution to the first-order conditions that characterize Ramsey policy. Another is that
our approach is easily extended to deal with more complex specifications, with little
increase in computational complexity. For example, allowing for higher-order auto-
correlation of the disturbances would be easy in the context of our LQ methodology,
and our specification of the disturbances as linear autoregressive processes also makes
it straightforward to parameterize these processes on the basis of empirical estimates.
3.3 Accuracy of the LQ Approximation
As we have explained (on the basis of more detailed discussion in Benigno and Wood-
ford, 2004b), the solution to the LQ approximate problem derived here yields a correct
local linear approximation to the exact decision rules that characterize optimal policy,
that should allow a computation of statistics like those presented in Table 3 that is of
arbitrary accuracy in the case that the disturbances are small enough in amplitude.
21We suspect a sign error in their table in the case of one entry.
22We also note that the ex post tax rate on income from capital varies so much that the mean of
the distribution is not well estimated by the sample mean of a stochastic simulation as short as the
ones reported in Table 2 of Chari et al. (1994). Simulations of our log-linear policy rules of only that
length resulted in sample means for the ex post capital income tax rate ranging between +1 and -1
percent, even though we know on analytical grounds that the mean tax rate is zero, as reported in
Table 3. Thus it is hard to tell, based on sample means from stochastic simulations as short as those
reported by Chari et al., how much of a difference there really is between the moments implied by
the approximation method used by Chari et al. and those implied by our LQ approximation.
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However, it may nonetheless be wondered how accurate such an approximation is in
the case of disturbances of the size typically experienced by the U.S. economy. In-
deed, Chari et al. (1994) adopt a minimum-weighted residual method for computing
approximations to the optimal decision rules because they report having found that
a “log-linearization method” led to a substantially less accurate characterization of
the optimal dynamics of the tax rates (1995, pp. 383-390). This suggests that we
should be concerned about the numerical accuracy of our log-linear approximation to
the optimal tax rules.
As shown above, however, our results obtained using the LQ approximation (Table
3) are quite similar to those reported by Chari et al. (1994) on the basis of their
nonlinear solution method. Of course, the sample moments reported in our table
are not identical to theirs; but they are much more similar than are the results that
Chari et al. (1995) report having obtained through “log-linearization”. For example,
in their Figure 12.3, Chari et al. (1995) report having obtained a higher standard
deviation of the labor tax rate under the log-linearization approach for all values of ϕ,
and a vastly higher variance in the case of values of ϕ near a critical value (between
-3 and -4) where the optimal variability of the labor tax rate falls essentially to
zero according to their nonlinear computations, but remains high according to the
log-linearization. But we also find with our LQ approximation23 that the optimal
variability of the labor income tax falls nearly to zero for a critical value of ϕ,24 while
it rises sharply for values of ϕ on either side of these values (see Figure 1), just as in
the figure of Chari et al.
Similarly, in their Figure 12.4A, they report that their log-linearization implies
that the mean ex-ante capital tax rate should be positive for all values of ϕ, and
substantially so (more than 3 percent) for large negative values of ϕ, while their
nonlinear method indicates that the mean rate should be zero for the case ϕ = 0,
and slightly negative in the case of ϕ < 0. But we find with our LQ approximation
23In considering the effects of variation in ϕ in Figures 1 and 2, we assume a value of τ¯h as a
function of ϕ that linearly interpolates between the two values specified in Table 1.
24In our computations, the critical value of ϕ is between -4 and -5, as is also reported in Chari
et al. (1994, Figure 3, panel (a)). Note that we assign parameter values as in Chari et al. (1994),
which uses a slightly different calibration than the one in Chari et al. (1995). Our Figure 1 still
differs somewhat from Figure 3(a) in Chari et al. (1994), mainly because our assumption of a simple
linear relation between τ¯h and ϕ does not exactly capture the way in which the steady state varies
with ϕ in their simulations, as shown by Figure 2(a) of their paper.
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that the mean ex ante capital tax rate is zero for all values of ϕ, rather than being
positive at all.
Finally, in their Figure 12.4B, they report that their log-linearization implies that
the standard deviation of the ex ante capital tax rate remains above 2 percent for
all ϕ ≤ 0, while their nonlinear method shows that it falls to zero when ϕ = 0. But
we also find with our LQ approximation that the standard deviation falls to zero
when ϕ = 0 (see Figure 2). The LQ approximation proposed here clearly leads to
quite different, and much more accurate, results than the log-linearization method
employed by Chari et al. (1995).25
A measure of the accuracy of the LQ approximate solution that does not depend
on comparison with the results of Chari et al. can be obtained by considering how
closely the log-linear dynamics that solve the LQ problem come to satisfying the exact
nonlinear first-order conditions that characterize optimal Ramsey policy (discussed
above in section 1.4). Here we do not treat this issue in detail (as it is unclear how
large a discrepancy should be regarded as acceptable), but consider, for purposes of
illustration, the degree to which our log-linear dynamics fit the Euler equation for
optimality of the rate of investment.26
As shown in the appendix, the stochastic version of Euler equation (1.34), after
using (1.32) to substitute for the Lagrange multiplier λ1t, can be written in the form
Rt = 0, (3.10)
where Rt is the value of the left-hand side of (the stochastic version of) equation
25Chari et al. report that their log-linearization method yielded fairly accurate results regarding
the optimal allocation of resources, but much less accurate results for the dynamics of the tax rates.
They propose that this is because “the policies depend on ratios of the derivatives of the utility
function and small errors in computing the allocations can lead to large errors in computing the
policies” (1995, p. 383). We doubt that this is a correct explanation of their results. For example,
given the optimal allocation, the optimal labor tax rate is given by solving (1.8), substituting (1.11)
for the real wage. But the resulting mapping from allocations to the tax rate is exactly linear in
τht , cˆt, kˆt, and zˆt; it is only the non-linearity of the dependence on hˆt that can possibly be a source
of error in our log-linear approximation to this relation, and even the dependence on that variable
is not more severely nonlinear than other equations involved in the determination of the optimal
allocation. Judd (1996, sec. 4) suggests that the inaccurate results reported by Chari et al. result
from their using an “ad hoc” method that does not result in a correct linear approximation to the
optimal policy rules, unlike our corrected LQ method.
26This is also the sole optimality condition for which Chari et al. (1995) discuss the size of the
Euler-equation residuals associated with their alternative numerical solutions.
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(1.34). In the case of the log-linear dynamics that solve the LQ problem, the (exact)
value of the residual Rt each period depends only on the state vector vt at that time;
in particular, we can write
Rt = R(vt) ≡ m(vt)− E[n(vt+1)|vt],
where vt is the same state vector as in (3.8), and m(v) and n(v) are explicit, nonlinear
functions defined in the appendix. The functions m(v) and n(v) can be computed
given numerical values for the model parameters, and the steady-state values h¯ and
λ0, that are computed in the manner explained earlier. The simulations provide
sequences {vt} for the state variables, that allow m(vt) to be evaluated for each
period. They also provide a value for kˆt+1 that (as a predetermined state variable)
should be known with certainty as of period t. Since we also know, given the state vt
in any period t, the probabilities of each of the finite number of possible values of zˆt+1
and gˆt+1 in the following period, we therefore have a complete conditional probability
distribution for the possible values of vt+1, allowing E[n(vt+1)|vt] to be evaluated for
each period of the simulation. This allows us to compute a residual sequence {Rt}
associated with the simulation; the size of these residuals provides a measure of the
accuracy of the approximate policy rules.
Figure 3 shows the histograms of these residuals for simulations of the log-linear
approximate policy rules obtained for each of the five cases in Table 3.27 One observes
that the residuals are quite small. In the case of log utility (the baseline preference
assumption) and serially correlated disturbances, the typical residual is on the order
of -.0001, meaning that the current marginal utility of consumption is smaller than the
level implied by the Euler equation by amount that is only .01 percent of the steady-
state marginal utility of consumption. The residuals are an order of magnitude smaller
in the case of serially uncorrelated disturbances (case 5), though they are three to
four times as large in the high-risk-aversion case as in the baseline case.28
Another way of assessing the accuracy of the LQ approximation is comparing
the results obtained using this approximation to those that would be obtained by
simulating second-order Taylor series approximations to the optimal policy rules,
27The simulations are the same ones that generate the sample moments reported in Table 5 below.
28We are unable to compare this degree of accuracy to that reported for the log-linearization
approach used in Chari et al. (1995), as the units in which the residuals are reported in their figures
are unclear.
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rather than the first-order approximations yielded by the LQ approximation.29 We
compute the coefficients of the second-order approximations to the optimal policy
rules (i.e., to the solution to the nonlinear first-order conditions characterizing Ramsey
policy) using the algorithm of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004), and then determine
the implied moments of the dynamics of the tax rate through Monte Carlo simulation.
In order to distinguish differences in the moments due to simulation (i.e., to sampling
error) from differences due to the inclusion of second-order terms in the policy rules,
we first present (in Table 5) the moments implied by the log-linearized policy rules,30
using Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the moments, rather than calculation of
the exact moments as in Table 3.31 (The numbers are similar, but not identical to
the ones reported in Table 3, mainly as a result of sampling error.) Here we report
the various statistics to three decimal places, rather than only two as in Table 3,32
to allow the small differences that are made by a second-order approximation more
evident.
Table 6 then displays the same moments, in the case that quadratic approxima-
tions to the optimal policy rules are used in the stochastic simulation, rather than the
linear rules. (We use exactly the same sequences for the exogenous disturbances in
the two cases, so that sampling error does not exaggerate the difference made by the
second-order terms.) We find that the inclusion of second-order terms in the various
equations used to derive our approximation to the optimal dynamics of the tax rates
has only very small effects on the moments reported in Table 5. This is true despite
29Second-order perturbation methods of this kind have been widely advocated in the recent lit-
erature as a way of ensuring that welfare is correctly evaluated to second order in the amplitude of
the disturbances; see, e.g., Jin and Judd (2002), Kim et al. (2003), and Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2004a, 2004b).
30Here the exact coefficients of the log-linear policy rules are also those computed using the algo-
rithm of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, i.e., direct log-linearization of the nonlinear first-order conditions
that characterize Ramsey policy, rather than solution of the LQ problem defined above. This al-
ternative approach to the computation of the log-linearized policy rules results in small numerical
differences from the policy rules used to generate the statistics reported in Table 3, though one can
show analytically that the two approaches should yield identical coefficients.
31The statistics reported in both Tables 5 and 6 are based on stochastic simulation of the ap-
proximate optimal policy rules for 500,000 periods, with the first 60,000 periods of each simulation
discarded to eliminate the effects of the arbitrary initial conditions.
32The degree of precision in Table 3 is chosen to match that of the results reported in Table 2 of
Chari et al. (1994).
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the fact that the second-order corrections to the policy rules do substantially reduce
the size of the Euler equation residuals, and thus do represent a better approximation
to the true nonlinear optimal policy rules.33 This suggests that a log-linear approxi-
mation to the optimal policy functions is fairly accurate, in the case of disturbances
of the size assumed in the exercise of Chari et al. (1994).34
4 Conclusion
We have shown, in the context of a familiar dynamic optimal taxation problem, that a
naive approach to linear-quadratic approximation of the problem would yield results
that are quite incorrect. At the same time, we have shown that it is possible to
define an alternative quadratic objective — one that also corresponds to expected
utility of the representative household, up to second order in the amplitude of the
disturbances, in the case of any possible equilibrium, but that involves variables other
than the arguments of the utility function itself — such that the LQ problem with
this objective yields a correct local log-linear approximation to optimal policy in the
case of small enough disturbances. We have also shown that the error involved in
such a local log-linear approximation to the optimal policy appears not to be large,
in the case of disturbances of the size that occur in a model calibrated to match
features of U.S. time series. This suggests that LQ approximation methods of the
kind illustrated here can usefully be employed in the analysis of optimal tax policy,
both as a simple approach to computation and as a source of insight into the nature
of optimal policy rules.
33The root-mean-square size of the Euler equation residuals corresponding to those shown in
Figure 3 is reduced by a factor greater than 35 in the baseline case (case 1) when the second-order
corrections are used; similarly dramatic reductions occur in the other cases. The Euler equation
residuals are also now nearly zero on average, rather than being almost always negative as shown in
Figure 3.




Derivation of equation (2.1).
Starting from (1.1), we note that a second-order Taylor series expansion of u(ct, ht)
takes the form
u(ct, ht) = u¯+ u¯c(ct − c¯) + u¯h(ht − h¯) + 1
2




u¯hh(ht − h¯)2 + u¯ch(ct − c¯)(ht − h¯) +O(||ξ||3),
where partial derivatives are all evaluated at the steady state values (c¯, h¯) of the
arguments of u.
We wish instead to expand in powers of the log deviations of consumption and
hours from their steady-state levels. We note that in general,







where xˆ ≡ lnxt/x¯. Using this to substitute for ct−c¯ and ht−h¯ in the above expression,
and suppressing terms of higher than second order in the log deviations, we obtain
(2.1).
Derivation of equation (2.8).
We begin by taking a second-order approximation of equation (1.15) in terms
of log deviations from the steady-state values of the various endogenous variables.
Rewriting the equation as





















where gˆt ≡ log(gt/g¯) and sc ≡ c¯/y¯, sg ≡ g¯/y¯, and sk ≡ k¯/y¯.
We similarly take a second-order approximation to the production function yt =
f(kt, ztht), which can be written as
yt − y¯ = f¯k(kt − k¯) + z¯f¯h(ht − h¯) + h¯f¯h(zt − z¯) + 1
2
fkk(kt − k¯)2 + 1
2
z¯2f¯hh(ht − h¯)2 +
+z¯fkh(kt − k¯)(ht − h¯) + h¯f¯kh(kt − k¯)(zt − z¯) + f¯h(ht − h¯)(zt − z¯)
+h¯z¯f¯hh(ht − h¯)(zt − z¯) + s.o.t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3).
34




yˆ2t = α(kˆt +
1
2
kˆ2t ) + (1− α)(hˆt + zˆt +
1
2







α(1− α)hˆ2t − α(1− α)kˆthˆt + α(1− α)kˆtzˆt − α(1− α)hˆtzˆt + s.o.t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3),




yˆ2t = α(kˆt +
1
2
kˆ2t ) + (1− α)(hˆt + zˆt +
1
2
hˆ2t ) + (1− α)hˆtzˆt +
−1
2
α(1− α)(kˆt − zˆt − hˆt)2 + s.o.t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3).
We can substitute in (4.1) to obtain


















(1− α)(hˆ2t + 2zˆthˆt) + s.o.t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3).














Derivation of equation (2.10)
Starting from (1.19), we first note that
uc(ct, ht)ct + uh(ct, ht)ht = u¯cc¯+ u¯hh¯+ u¯c(ct − c¯) +
c¯[u¯cc(ct − c¯) + u¯ch(ht − h¯) + 1
2
u¯ccc(ct − c¯)2 +
1
2
u¯chh(ht − h¯)2 + u¯cch(ct − c¯)(ht − h¯)] + u¯cc(ct − c¯)2
+u¯ch(ct − c¯)(ht − h¯) + u¯h(ht − h¯) +
+h¯[u¯hc(ct − c¯) + u¯hh(ht − h¯) + 1
2




u¯hcc(ct − c¯)2 + u¯hhc(ht − h¯)(ct − c¯)] +
u¯hh(ht − h¯)2 + u¯hc(ht − h¯)(ct − c¯) +O(||ξ||3)
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and then obtain
uc(ct, ht)ct + uh(ct, ht)ht = u¯cc¯[cˆt +
1
2
cˆ2t ] + c¯[u¯ccc¯(cˆt +
1
2

































2cˆ2t + u¯hhcc¯h¯cˆthˆt] + u¯hhh¯
2hˆ2t +
+u¯chc¯h¯cˆthˆt + t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3).
We can simplify the above expression to
uc(ct, ht)ct + uh(ct, ht)ht = u¯cc¯{(1− σ−1)(cˆt + 1
2



































+ψψ1cˆthˆt − φνhˆ2t + ψhˆtcˆt}+ t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3),
where σ−11 ≡ u¯cccc¯/u¯cc, ψ1 ≡ u¯chhh¯/u¯ch, ψ2 ≡ u¯cchh¯/u¯cc, ν1 ≡ u¯hhhh¯/u¯hh. Plugging















(1− σ−1 + ψ − σ−1σ−11 − σ−1ψ2 − 2σ−1)cˆ2t +
+(ψψ1 − σ−1ψ2 + 2ψ)cˆthˆt}
+s.o.t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3). (4.2)
We further note that
Wt ≡ bst−1uc(ct, ht) + uc(ct, ht)kt[(1− δ˜) + (1− τ kt )fk(ztht, kt) + δρ−1τ kt ],
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where
δρ−1 = ρ−1 − (1− δ˜).
We then have as a first-order expansion of the constraint that




[u¯c(kt − k¯) + k¯u¯cc(ct − c¯) + k¯u¯ch(ht − h¯)] +
+u¯ck¯{[f¯kk(kt − k¯) + h¯f¯kh(zt − z¯) + z¯f¯kh(ht − h¯)]− (f¯k − δρ−1)τ kt }+O(||ξ||2),
which can be written as
Wt − W¯ = u¯cb¯bˆt−1 − u¯cb¯[σ−1cˆt − ψhˆt] + u¯ck¯
β˜
(kˆt − σ−1cˆt + ψhˆt) +
+u¯ck¯
2f¯kk(kˆt − zˆt − hˆt)− u¯ck¯(f¯k − δρ−1)τ kt +O(||ξ||2).
Hence
scW˜t = sbbˆt−1 − sb[σ−1cˆt − ψhˆt] + β˜−1sk(kˆt − σ−1cˆt + ψhˆt)
−α(1− α)(kˆt − zˆt − hˆt)− (α− skδρ−1)τ kt +O(||ξ||2),
where sb ≡ b¯/y¯ and W˜t ≡ (W˜t − W¯ )/u¯cc¯.
We finally note that
(α− skδρ−1) = sk(αs−1k − ρ−1 + (1− δ˜)) = sk(β˜
−1 − ρ−1).








t−1 − bccˆt + bhhˆt + bkkˆt + s−1c α(1− α)zˆt − bττ kt ,
where we have defined bc ≡ sbσ−1 + β˜−1skσ−1, bh ≡ sbψ + β˜−1skψ + α(1 − α),
bk ≡ β˜−1sk−α(1−α), dc ≡ (1−σ−1+ψ), dh ≡ (ψ−φ−φν) and bτ ≡ sk(β˜−1−ρ−1).
Second-order conditions

















kˆt − s−1k sccˆt + s−1k (1− αk)(zˆt + hˆt)− s−1k sggˆt (4.4)





T−t0{dccˆT + dhhˆT} (4.5)
at time t0 given the initial conditions kˆt0 and W˜t0 = W¯t0 .
We study under which conditions the solution to the above optimization problem
corresponds indeed to a minimum, i.e. under which conditions second order condi-
tions are satisfied. This analysis boils down to study under which restrictions the
quadratic form (4.3) is positive definite under the sequence of constraints (4.4) and
the constraint (4.5). Let us assume that {cˆt, hˆt, kˆt+1}∞t=t0 is an optimal plan for the
above problem and define the sequences
cˆ†t = cˆt + ψc,t,
hˆ†t = hˆt + ψh,t,
kˆ†t+1 = kˆt+1 + ψk,t






ψ2j,t <∞ for j = c, h, k, (4.6)
plus the sequence of constraints
ψk,t = β˜
−1
ψk,t−1 − s−1k scψc,t + s−1k (1− α)ψh,t (4.7)





T−t0{dcψc,T + dhψh,T} = 0 (4.8)
at time t0 with initial condition ψk,t0−1 = 0. It follows that the process {cˆ†t , hˆ†t ,
kˆ†t+1}∞t=t0 is a feasible perturbation to the optimal plan and achieves a loss given by
Lt0(cˆ





[qc(cˆt − θhˆt)(ψc,t − θψh,t) + qhψh,t(hˆt − h∗t ) +






[qc(ψc,t − θψh,t)2 + qhψ2h,t + qk(ψk,t−1 − ψh,t)2].
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Since the sequences {cˆt, hˆt, kˆt+1}∞t=t0 satisfy necessary conditions for an optimal plan,






[qc(cˆt−θhˆt)(ψc,t−θψh,t)+qhψh,t(hˆt−h∗t )+qk((kˆt−(zˆt+hˆt))(ψk,t−1−ψh,t)] = 0.






[qc(ψc,t − θψh,t)2 + qhψ2h,t + qk(ψk,t−1 − ψh,t)2] > 0 (4.9)
for all processes {ψc,t, ψh,t, ψk,t}∞t=t0 satisfying (4.6), (4.7) and (4.8) given ψk,t0−1 = 0.
First we show that we can disregard constraint (4.8) from the analysis. Let us
define ψt ≡ (ψc,t, ψh,t, ψk,t).Given a process {ψt}∞t=t0 that satisfies only the constraints
(4.6) and (4.7) given ψk,t0−1 = 0 and such that (4.9) is negative, we can construct
a process {ψ¯t}∞t=t0 with ψ¯t0 = 0 and ψ¯t+1 = σt0+1ψt for each t > t0, where σt0+1
is a sunspot variable known at time t0 + 1 which takes either value 1 or −1 with
probability 1/2. The constructed process {ψ¯t}∞t=t0 still satisfies (4.6), (4.7) and in
addition it satisfies the constraint (4.8) while achieving a negative value for the loss
function (4.9).
It follows that {cˆt, hˆt, kˆt+1}∞t=t0 will be a minimum if and only (4.9) is positive for
all processes {ψt}∞t=t0 that satisfy only the constraints (4.6), (4.7) and ψk,t0−1 = 0.
In Benigno and Woodford (2004b), we further show that this stochastic problem can
be reconnected to a deterministic problem of the kind analyzed by Telser and Graves
(1972), in which the sequence {ψt}∞t=t0 can be complex valued.
To make this parallel, we can write the problem in a more compact way by rewrit-












with ψx,t ≡ ψc,t − θψh,t and the matrix B(L) as
B(L) =
 qc 0 00 qh + qk −2qkL
0 0 qk
 .





















x˜‡t x˜t <∞ (4.10)
Following Telser and Graves (1972), we can make the following transformation of
variables by defining xt as xt ≡ β˜
t
2 x˜t. Second-order conditions of the original problem








is positive definite for sequences {xt} that satisfies (4.10) and the sequence of con-
straints A(β˜
1
2L)xt = 0 at each t ≥ 0 given ψk,−1 = 0.



















is non-singular for all −pi ≤ ϑ ≤ pi provided qc, qh, qk are all different from zero and
since the matrix A(β˜
1
2 e−iϑ) is of rank 1 for all −pi ≤ ϑ ≤ pi, we can then use theorem
5.2 in Telser and Graves (1972) which allow to study second-order conditions in terms

















where in our case
H(ϑ) =

0 s−1k sc s
−1
k scθ − s−1k (1− α) 1− β˜
1
2 e−iϑ
s−1k sc qc 0 0











Since m = 1, the second-order conditions are satisfied if and only the northwest
principal minors of order p > 2 have all the same sign as (−1)m = −1. For the case






k scθ − s−1k (1− α)
s−1k sc qc 0
s−1k scθ − s−1k (1− α) 0 qh + qk
 .
The determinant of H1is negative if and only if (i) the inequality
s2c(qh + qk) + qc[(1− α)− θsc]2 > 0 (4.11)
is satisfied.
For the case p = 4, we must also require the determinant of the bordered Hessian
H(ϑ) to be negative for all −pi ≤ ϑ ≤ pi. This determinant is equal to










iϑs−1k (scθ − (1− α)) +
−(1− β˜
1
2 eiϑ)(qh + qk)]


















2 − 2 cosϑ)[(1− α)− θsc]s−1k qcqk




detH(ϑ) < 0 for all − pi ≤ ϑ ≤ pi









2 − cosϑ)[(1− α)− θsc]s−1k qcqk
+qc(qh + qk)[1 + β˜ − 2β˜
1
2 cosϑ] > 0
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holds for all −pi ≤ ϑ ≤ pi. Hence the second-order conditions are satisfied if and
only if both (i) and (ii) hold. (We can further reduce condition (ii) to a finite
set of inequalities by considering the value of ϑ that minimizes the left-hand side
expression.)
We note that when qh, qc and qk are positive, as in the numerical examples con-
sidered in the text, then (i) and (ii) are always satisfied for all −pi ≤ ϑ ≤ pi. The





2 − cosϑ)2 + qc(qh + qk) sin2 ϑ
+qkqc[β˜
1
2 s−1k ((1− α)− θsc)− (β˜
1
2 − cosϑ)]2,
and each of these terms is necessarily positive when qh, qc and qk are positive.
Euler Equation Residuals
In the stochastic case, the exact Euler equations that characterize Ramsey op-
timal policy, corresponding to equations (1.32) and (1.34) of section 1.4, are given
respectively by
uc(ct, ht)− [uc(ct, ht) + ucc(ct, ht)ct + uhc(ct, ht)ht]λ0 − λ1,t = 0
and
λ1,t − βEt{[fk(kt+1, zt+1ht+1) + (1− δ)]λ1,t+1} = 0,
for each t ≥ t0. In terms of the detrended variables, these conditions can be rewritten
as
uc(c˜t, ht)− [uc(c˜t, ht) + ucc(c˜t, ht)c˜t + uhc(c˜t, ht)ht]λ0 − λ˜1,t = 0 (4.12)
and
λ˜1,t − β˜Et{[f˜k(k˜t+1, z˜t+1ht+1) + (1− δ˜)]λ˜1,t+1} = 0 (4.13)
respectively, where
λ˜1t ≡ λ1tρ[1−ϕ(1−γ)]t,
and the other detrended variables are defined as in section 1.3.35
35Note that equations (1.32) and (1.34) of section 1.4 are already written in terms of the detrended
variables.
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Using (4.12) to eliminate λ˜1t in (4.13), and again dropping the tildes from the de-
trended variables (that are henceforth to be understood), we obtain an Euler equation
of the form
Λ(ct, ht) = β˜Et[Λ(ct+1, ht+1)r(kt+1/zt+1ht+1)], (4.14)
where we define
Λ(c, h) ≡ uc(c, h)− λ0[uc(c, h) + ucc(c, h)c+ uhc(c, h)h],
r(κ) ≡ f˜k(κ, 1) + (1− δ˜).
This condition is equivalent to Rt = 0, where we define the residual Rt as the left-hand
side of (4.14) minus the right-hand side, divided by uc(c¯, h¯). The normalization implies
that a value of .01 for the residual means that λ˜1t exceeds β˜Et[(f˜k+(1− δ˜))λ˜1,t+1] by
an amount equal to one percent of the steady-state marginal utility of consumption.
The residual Rt each period is given by a function R(vt) of the state vector vt ≡
(kˆt, zˆt, gˆt) for that period of the simulation, where





In this formula, s(vt) denotes the exogenous state st ≡ (zˆt, gˆt) implied by the state
vector vt (just the last two elements of the vector); pi(s
′|s) is the probability that the
exogenous state st+1 = s
′ given that st = s; the summation is over the possible values
s′ for the exogenous state st+1; and kˆ′(vt) is the log-linear policy rule that gives the
value of kˆt+1 as a function of vt, in the solution to the LQ policy problem.
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Using the functional forms for preferences given in the text, the functions m(v)















36In computing the corresponding residuals in the case of the second-order perturbation solution,
we define the function R(v) in the same way, except that the function kˆ′(v) is now a quadratic
approximation to the optimal policy rule.
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where
r(v) ≡ [β˜−1 − (1− δ˜)] · exp[(1− α)(zˆ + hˆ− kˆ)] + (1− δ˜).
In each of these last expressions, cˆ, hˆ, zˆ and kˆ should be understood to be functions
of v (cˆ(v), etc.), in which the argument has been suppressed. The functions zˆ(v) and
kˆ(v) select particular elements of the state vector (zˆt and kˆt respectively), while the
functions cˆ(v) and hˆ(v) represent the log-linear policy rules that specify the optimal
values for cˆt and hˆt as functions of vt.
37 Note that computation of the functions m(v)
and n(v), and hence computation of the function R(v), requires only numerical values
for the model parameters ϕ, γ, β˜, δ˜, and α, and steady-state values for h¯ and λ¯0.
37Again, in the case of the residuals for the second-order solution, the functions cˆ(v) and hˆ(v) are
quadratic approximations to the optimal policy rules.
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zˆt : ρz = 0.81 σz = 0.041
gˆt : ρg = 0.89 σg = 0.070
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Table 3: Statistics on optimal tax rates according to the LQ approximation.
baseline high r.a. only z only g IID
Tax Rate on Labor Income
E(τ) 23.87 20.69 23.87 23.87 23.87
s.d.(τ) .10 .03 .07 .06 .15
ρ(τ) .77 .81 .69 .90 -.07
corr(τ , gˆ) .62 -.55 NA 1.00 .10
corr(τ , zˆ) .49 -.80 .63 NA .95
Ex Ante Tax Rate on Capital Income
E(τ) 0 0 0 0 0
s.d.(τ) 0 3.29 0 0 0
ρ(τ) NA .80 NA NA NA
corr(τ , gˆ) NA .25 NA NA NA
corr(τ , zˆ) NA .97 NA NA NA
Ex Post Tax Rate on Capital Income
E(τ) 0 0 0 0 0
s.d.(τ) 36.13 30.56 15.77 32.51 10.81
ρ(τ) 0 -.00 0 0 0
corr(τ , gˆ) .41 .44 NA .46 0.91
corr(τ , zˆ) -.26 -.13 -.59 NA -.41
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Table 4: Statistics on optimal tax rates reported by Chari et al. (1994, Table 2).
baseline high r.a. only z only g IID
Tax Rate on Labor Income
E(τ) 23.87 20.69 23.80 23.87 23.84
s.d.(τ) .10 .04 .08 .06 .15
ρ(τ) .80 .85 .71 .90 -.04
corr(τ , gˆ) .65 -.59 NA 1.00 .10
corr(τ , zˆ) .55 -.84 .64 NA .95
Ex Ante Tax Rate on Capital Income
E(τ) 0 -.06 0 0 0
s.d.(τ) 0 4.06 0 0 0
ρ(τ) NA .83 NA NA NA
corr(τ , gˆ) NA .33 NA NA NA
corr(τ , zˆ) NA .96 NA NA NA
Ex Post Tax Rate on Capital Income
E(τ) .55 -.42 1.19 -.59 .23
s.d.(τ) 40.93 30.35 17.67 36.22 12.03
ρ(τ) -.01 .02 .01 .01 -.02
corr(τ , gˆ) .40 .47 NA .46 .94
corr(τ , zˆ) -.24 -.02 -.56 NA .33∗
∗We suspect this entry may be reported with a sign error.
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Figure 1: Variability of optimal tax rate on labor income for alternative values of ϕ,
according to our LQ approximation.
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Figure 2: Variability of optimal ex ante tax rate on capital income for alternative
values of ϕ, according to our LQ approximation.
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Case 1 − RMS=0.00010084









Case 2 − RMS=0.00036176






Case 3 − RMS=9.052e−005











Case 4 − RMS=1.0814e−005








Case 5 − RMS=0.00013126
Figure 3: Distributions of Euler-equation residuals in the simulation of the log-linear
dynamics that solve the LQ problem, for each of the 5 cases treated in Table 5. The
caption for each panel indicates the root-mean-square residual size in that simulation.
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Table 5: Statistics on optimal tax rates from Monte Carlo simulation of log-linearized
optimal policy rules.
baseline high r.a. only z only g IID
Tax Rate on Labor Income
E(τ) 23.870 20.690 23.870 23.870 23.870
s.d.(τ) .095 .034 .074 .059 .147
ρ(τ) .766 .811 .685 .895 -.068
corr(τ , gˆ) .620 -.550 NA .999 .099
corr(τ , zˆ) .496 -.802 .632 NA .954
Ex Ante Tax Rate on Capital Income
E(τ) 0 .002 0 0 0
s.d.(τ) 0 3.289 0 0 0
ρ(τ) NA .804 NA NA NA
corr(τ , gˆ) NA .252 NA NA NA
corr(τ , zˆ) NA .965 NA NA NA
Ex Post Tax Rate on Capital Income
E(τ) .001 .003 -.003 .004 .001
s.d.(τ) 36.155 30.581 15.769 32.512 10.818
ρ(τ) -.000 -.003 -.002 -.000 -.000
corr(τ , gˆ) .410 .444 NA .456 0.913
corr(τ , zˆ) -.255 -.132 -.586 NA -.409
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Table 6: Statistics on optimal tax rates from a second-order approximation to the
policy rules.
baseline high r.a. only z only g IID
Tax Rate on Labor Income
E(τ) 23.873 20.687 23.870 23.873 23.871
s.d.(τ) .095 .034 .074 .059 .147
ρ(τ) .766 .811 .685 .895 -.068
corr(τ , gˆ) .621 -.550 NA 1.000 .099
corr(τ , zˆ) .496 -.802 .632 NA .954
Ex Ante Tax Rate on Capital Income
E(τ) 0 .027 0 0 0
s.d.(τ) 0 3.316 0 0 0
ρ(τ) NA .803 NA NA NA
corr(τ , gˆ) NA .250 NA NA NA
corr(τ , zˆ) NA .957 NA NA NA
Ex Post Tax Rate on Capital Income
E(τ) .529 .030 .953 -.435 .503
s.d.(τ) 36.302 30.770 15.801 32.513 10.914
ρ(τ) -.001 -.004 -.002 -.000 -.000
corr(τ , gˆ) .409 .442 NA .456 0.905
corr(τ , zˆ) -.254 -.132 -.585 NA -.406
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